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Abstract
While the effect of teachers’ unions on school districts continues to be debated, the research literature provides few
definitive conclusions to guide these discussions. In this article, we examine the relationship between teachers’ union
contracts and school district efficiency. We define efficiency as the ratio of short-run productivity (student performance on
standardized exams) to expenditures. We estimate a series of school district fixed effect models using measures of district
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) restrictiveness tied to longitudinal outcomes. We find that CBA restrictiveness is
positively associated with expenditures on students, instruction, instruction support services, and teacher and administrator
salaries over time. We find no significant relationship between CBA restrictiveness and student achievement. Finally, we find
a negative relationship between CBA restrictiveness and district efficiency. Given the small magnitude of our effect sizes, we
conclude that weakening union rights may not produce large gains in efficiency and may come at substantial political costs.
Keywords
teachers’ unions, collective bargaining, expenditures, achievement, efficiency

Introduction
Over the last decade, public debate regarding the benefits
and costs of teachers’ unions in public education has
increased. This is apparent in the sizable amount of legislation and litigation considered in statehouses and courthouses
and the unprecedented amount of labor action in school districts around the nation. In 2018, the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. AFSCME removed the 41-year-old precedent
allowing public-sector unions to collect agency fees from
employees who do not wish to join their union, which could
decimate the ranks of teachers’ unions around the country
(Marianno & Strunk, 2018a). Although not yet subject to
supreme court review, there has also been a great deal of
policy attention paid to teachers’ unions’ rights to collectively bargain, and to the specific aspects over which they do
negotiate with local school district boards and administrations (Marianno, 2015). At the same time, teacher strikes
around the country in 2018 and 2019 showcased renewed
union activism, suggesting that teachers’ unions will continue to be a formidable force for advocating on behalf of
teachers, notwithstanding the recent spate of unfavorable
policy enactments and court rulings.
Much of the debate on teachers’ unions in public education hinges on the productivity and efficiency effects of
union activities. Those critical of teachers’ unions frequently
argue that unions advocate for policies and negotiate lengthy

collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) that burden districts and schools with overly rigid work rules. These work
rules, critics argue, make operations inflexible to changing
fiscal and accountability contexts and institutionalize costly
procedures that are inefficient and ineffective ways to run
schools (e.g., Ballou, 2000; Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hess &
Loup, 2008; Hess & West, 2006; Hoxby, 1996; Moe, 2001,
2009). In contrast, those in support of teachers’ unions argue
that the policies advocated for by unions and ensconced in
agreements protect teachers from the arbitrary and capricious behavior of administrators and afford them a voice in
the policies that affect their work (e.g., Bascia & Rottmann,
2011; Casey, 2006; Johnson & Donaldson, 2006; Kaboolian,
2006).
While the research base on collective bargaining in public
education is growing, the literature provides very few definitive conclusions on the effects of this union activity to guide
policymaker judgments on whether to reduce or expand
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union rights (see Cowen & Strunk, 2015, for a review). In
particular, most prior literature on the effect of local unions
and contracts on resource inputs (i.e., district expenditures)
and productive outputs (i.e., student learning) estimates these
relationships at a single point in time, often with dichotomous measures, making it difficult to assess how changes to
local union strength and CBAs are associated with changes
in resources and productivity. In addition, the effect of unions
on resource inputs is often evaluated separately from the
effect on productive outputs, with only a few exceptions
(e.g., Brunner et al., 2019). Without a simultaneous understanding of the effect on both achievement and resource allocation, we cannot draw clear conclusions about the benefits
or costs of union activity in education.
In this article, we add to the literature about the effects of
teachers’ unions on school district administration by using a
longitudinal dataset from California school districts to estimate the relationship between CBAs and district efficiency
over time. We bring to bear a measure of CBA or contract
restrictiveness that has been broadly used in the education
literature, in which we define contract restrictiveness as the
extent to which the CBAs negotiated between teachers’
unions and their school district counterparts impose restrictions on administrators in the management of day-to-day
school operations (e.g., Goldhaber et al., 2013; Marianno
et al., 2018; Marianno & Strunk, 2018b; Strunk et al., 2018,
2019; Strunk & Grissom, 2010; Strunk & Reardon, 2010).
Our measure of contract restrictiveness relies on a partial
independence item response model that estimates the restrictiveness of approximately 500 California school district
CBAs in place during the 2005–2006, 2008–2009, 2011–
2012, and 2014–2015 school years. We then model district
expenditures, student achievement, and district efficiency
(defined as a ratio of student achievement-to-district expenditures) as a function of contract restrictiveness.
Once we account for district and year fixed effects, relationships between contract restrictiveness and student
achievement are negative, but small and not significant.
However, contract restrictiveness is positively associated
with overall spending, including spending on instruction,
instructional support services, and salaries for both teachers
and administrators. Altogether, we find that a standard deviation increase in contract restrictiveness is associated with a
decrease in district efficiency of 1.3% to 2.4%.
This article proceeds as follows. The “Theoretical
Perspectives on Teachers’ Unions and Efficiency” section
provides background on the theoretical rationale for how
teachers’ unions may influence productivity and efficiency.
The “Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Teachers’ Unions
on Operations” section outlines the exiting empirical literature on the topic. The “Data” section outlines the data and
methods we use in our analysis. The “Empirical Strategy”
section details our empirical strategy, and the “Results” section provides the results. The “Discussion and Conclusion”
section concludes with a discussion of the implications of
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our results for our theoretical and empirical understanding of
the effect of unions on public education.

Theoretical Perspectives on Teachers’
Unions and Efficiency
In “What Do Unions Do?” Freeman and Medoff (1984) proposed two faces of union power—monopoly and voice.
These perspectives have formed the theoretical foundation
for much of the empirical work on unions for more than three
decades and provide theoretical expectations for how unions
might influence school district efficiency (Gunderson, 2005).

The Monopoly or Rent-Seeking Union
The monopoly face of union power recognizes that by
monopolizing the supply of labor to firms, unions acquire
bargaining power that they can use to negotiate for wages
and working conditions above what would be afforded in a
competitive market (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Kaufman,
2004). For example, rent-seeking unions in education, due to
their monopolistic power over the supply of teacher labor to
public school districts and through their political coalitions,
can advocate for patterns of school resource allocation that
are consistent with teachers’ preferences, which may or may
not coincide with resource allocations that have the highest
marginal benefit for student learning (Hoxby, 1996). Thus, if
union bargaining reallocates resources away from more productive activities, then districts may face higher costs without commensurate gains in student performance, leading to
inefficiencies in the production of education as a result of
union activity.

Union Voice
Borrowing on Hirschman’s (1970) exit-voice framework,
Freeman and Medoff (1984) proposed that when unions represent the desires and preferences of their members, the
actions they take through collective bargaining serve important voice functions by affording employees the opportunity
to raise grievances in lieu of exiting employment. Freeman
and Medoff suggest several different reasons why the proxy
exercise of employee voice by unions should enhance the
productivity of inputs and thereby improve efficiency. First,
the advancement of employee interests by the union should
reduce employee turnover, which will lower hiring and training costs. Unions also implement procedures that link promotions and rewards to seniority instead of to managerial
prerogatives, which may reduce rivalry and increase collaboration and informal training among employees. Unions can
similarly enhance productivity by enforcing job standards
and accountability for management such that firms can maintain productivity even as wages rise. Finally, unions can
assess and communicate the desires of all employees so that
management can better optimize the distribution of resources
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between wages and working conditions and thereby raise the
marginal productivity of their workforce.
In reality, unions likely embody both the monopoly and
voice faces, and which dominates in practice is an open
empirical question. In the next section, we discuss the existing evidence on the monopoly and voice effects of teachers’
unions and why a direct test of the efficiency effects of teachers’ union activity is warranted.

Empirical Evidence on the Effects of
Teachers’ Unions on Operations
Monopoly and voice theories of union power both find some
support in the research literature. Evidence on the budgetary
effects of teachers’ unions is largely found in economics and
education journals dating back to the 1970s. These studies
find that unionized and bargaining school districts have
higher expenditures (Chambers, 1977; Duplantis et al., 1995;
Eberts, 1983; Eberts & Stone, 1984, 1986; Gallagher, 1979;
Hoxby, 1996), and many of these expenditures are directed
toward increases in teacher salaries (Duplantis et al., 1995;
Gallagher, 1979; Hoxby, 1996; Zwerling & Thomason,
1995). In the state-level studies on the topic, Paglayan (2019)
and Frandsen (2016) find that laws affording teachers the
right to collectively bargaining did not lead to increases in
the level of resources devoted to education.1 However,
Brunner et al. (2019) find that districts in states with strong
teachers’ unions increased local education expenditures following school finance reforms.
Most existing studies employ dichotomous indicators that
capture the presence or absence of unions but are unable to
empirically capture the influence of the activities unions
engage in, like collective bargaining. This is particularly
important in states where there is little variation in union status because most teachers are unionized. New methodological developments strive to solve this problem by generating
a measure of contract restrictiveness built from an in-depth
content analysis of individual contracts (Strunk & Reardon,
2010). Drawing on over 600 provisions from teacher contracts, the measure captures the degree to which a given CBA
“restricts” the purview of school and district administrators
in their management of the daily work of teachers (Goldhaber
et al., 2013; Marianno et al., 2018; Strunk et al., 2018, 2019).
Using such measures for a cross-section of school districts in
California, Strunk (2011) finds that restrictive CBAs are
associated with higher overall district expenditures and
decreased spending on instructional materials.
Of course, if increases in public expenditures are met with
commensurate returns to performance, then there may be
improvements (or at least no loss) in efficiency because of
union activities. The literature on the performance effects of
teachers’ unions, however, is mixed (Cowen & Strunk, 2015;
Goldhaber, 2006). Some studies find that students in unionized school districts perform significantly better than their
nonunion counterparts (Argys & Rees, 1995; Eberts & Stone,
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1984, 1987; Milkman, 1997). These findings are consistent
with the notion that union activity leads to productivityenhancing reallocations of resources by school districts.
A limitation of these early studies on unionization and
productivity is that they assess relationships over a limited
time horizon, generally in a single-year cross-section.
Because unions are not randomly assigned to school districts
but tend to arise in areas where working conditions are more
difficult (e.g., Moe, 2009; Strunk, 2011, 2012; Strunk &
McEachin, 2012), unobserved working conditions could lead
to spurious relationships between unionization and productivity. More recent studies use identification strategies that
attempt to account for the endogenous sorting of unions to
workplaces by exploiting the plausibly exogenous timing of
union certification elections, union bargaining laws, or
union-related policy changes, and find a negative effect or no
effect of unionization on productivity (Hart & Sojourner,
2015; Hoxby, 1996; Lott & Kenny, 2013; Lovenheim, 2009;
Lovenheim & Willen, 2016; Quinby, 2017).2 Roth (2017)
explores changes in teacher turnover and student achievement following the enactment of Wisconsin Act 10, which
substantially reduced teacher bargaining rights, and finds
that student performance improved in elementary grades
where teachers retired following the reform. However,
Baron’s (2018) later study finds that Wisconsin high school
student achievement decreased as a result of Act 10.
Marianno and Strunk (2018b) find that once time-invariant
district working conditions are accounted for, the relationship between contract restrictiveness and student achievement in California school districts is at worst small and
negative and, at best, zero. Brunner et al. (2019) find that
following school finance reforms, the increase in and reallocation of local education expenditures associated with union
influence translated into larger achievement gains. This
could imply greater efficiency as a result of union activity.

Contributions of the Present Study
This study makes a few advancements over prior research.
Altogether, the extant research finds some evidence that
teachers’ unions are associated with increased costs for
school districts, though their effects on productivity remain
ambiguous. More importantly, we still know little about how
changes in the intensity of union activities (not just the presence or absence of them) are associated with school district
expenditures and student achievement. Most prior studies
employ limited measures of unionization that fail to capture
the degree of union activities (e.g., Argys & Rees, 1995;
Eberts & Stone, 1987; Milkman, 1997). In this study, we utilize a continuous measure of contract restrictiveness built on
a close content analysis of CBAs over time.
More uncertain still are the implications of teachers’
unions on the efficiency of school districts, because few
studies on teachers’ unions consider district inputs and outputs simultaneously. In short, it is not clear that we can infer
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from prior research on the effect of unions on resource inputs
and productivity outputs anything about the effect of unionization on efficiency. This is because our knowledge on the
effect of unionization on resources (e.g., Chambers, 1977;
Duplantis et al., 1995; Eberts, 1983) and the effect of unionization on productivity (e.g., Argys & Rees, 1995; Eberts &
Stone, 1987; Hart & Sojourner, 2015; Lott & Kenny, 2013;
Milkman, 1997; Moe, 2009) results mainly from separate
studies performed in different contexts and time periods, on
different samples, and with different identification strategies.
We therefore build on prior research by employing a series of
performance-to-expenditure ratios as more direct measures
of the efficiency of public school districts (Ryan et al., 2017).
As discussed below, a higher ratio of achievement-to-expenditures suggests that districts are more productive at any
given level of expenditure. We anticipate that if contract
restrictiveness is indeed associated with the inefficient use of
scarce resources, as suggested by union rent-seeking theories, then we would observe a negative relationship between
contract restrictiveness and our achievement-to-expenditure
ratios. In contrast, a positive relationship would support the
union voice view, that bargaining improves the efficiency of
district inputs by making district policy more effective.
Finally, as discussed above, much of the extant research on
unions relies on cross-sectional data in which relationships
are likely to be affected by unobserved differences between
school districts. Instead, we use a longitudinal dataset that follows contract restrictiveness and school district productivity
for approximately a decade. This enables us to use school district and year fixed effects to account for unobserved factors
related to contract restrictiveness, district inputs, and student
achievement, all likely sources of bias in prior work.

Data
We draw on 11 years of school district data. As in prior work
on teachers’ unions (e.g., Koski & Horng, 2007; Strunk,
2011, 2012; Strunk & McEachin, 2012; Strunk & Reardon,
2010), we limit analysis to districts in California. Our database contains information on the CBAs from school districts
in California with at least four schools. While this only
includes approximately half of the nearly 1,000 school districts that operate in California in each year, the labor-intensive nature of collecting and analyzing several hundred
CBAs over four bargaining cycles necessitates this limitation. In addition, as shown in prior work (Strunk, 2012), the
CBAs in very small districts look different than those in
larger districts. For example, CBA provisions governing the
manner in which teachers transfer between schools may
serve little to no purpose in a district with only a few schools.

Contract Restrictiveness
One of the primary ways in which unions secure their interests is through collective bargaining or contract negotiations
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with employers on behalf of their membership. These agreements can be fairly lengthy and contain hundreds of provisions that set boundaries on the working relationship between
personnel and administration (e.g., the length of the workday, the number and duration of faculty meetings). Strunk
and Reardon (2010) pioneered a process by which to estimate the degree to which contracts impose restrictions on the
work of management using a partial independent item
response (PIIR) model. The PIIR model operates on the
premise that each CBA has a latent restrictiveness that can be
inferred from the presence or absence of various provisions
that constrain district operations (e.g., a provision limiting
the length of the teacher workday to 7.25 hr or less), much as
a correct or incorrect answer on a test can be used to infer a
student’s latent understanding of a subject. Prior research
finds that the resulting contract-based measure from the PIIR
model is positively correlated with school board member
perceptions of local union strength, the fraction of board
members who received a union endorsement, union assistance in fundraising, and union campaign volunteer support
(Strunk & Grissom, 2010).
Following Strunk and Reardon (2010), we estimate the
extent to which a CBA restricts district administrators by collecting and analyzing CBAs from a selection of California
school districts. Because California law requires that districts
and unions negotiate new agreements at least every 3 years,
we collected contracts once every 3 years beginning with
contracts in place during the 2005–2006 school year, with
subsequent collections taking place for the 2008–2009,
2011–2012, and 2014–2015 school years.3 The average contract length in California is approximately 94 single-spaced
pages, with provisions spanning 15 general areas of the contract—contract negotiations, association rights, compensation, class size, evaluation, grievances, benefits, layoffs,
leaves, nonteaching duties, professional development, early
retirement, retirement, school workday, and transfers. The
mean length of time in which a CBA in our sample is active
is 2.6 years, with 95% of CBAs spanning 3 years or less. We
find that 19% of CBAs were first effective in the year of collection, 33% were first effective in the year prior to collection, and 25% were first effective 2 years prior to collection.
We code the contract from each collection year for 253
contract items across all 15 areas of the contract. To identify
which of these items reliably indicate underlying restrictiveness, we conduct a Cronbach’s alpha item analysis to eliminate weakly related items. We employ all years of data in the
alpha item analysis, which reduced the 253 coded items to
the 34 items presented in Online Appendix Table A1 (α =
.83). These 34 items are then used to estimate each contract’s
overall restrictiveness.
The PIIR model allows for the fact that some provisions
will be interdependent such that a more restrictive provision
can only be present if a less restrictive “gate” provision is
also present (e.g., the teacher workday cannot be limited to 7
hr or less unless it is also restricted to 7.25 hr or less). Thus,
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while each contract provision is measured dichotomously
based on its presence or absence, more and less restrictive
provisions governing the same district behavior can also be
incorporated by modeling their interdependence. The model
is formally estimated as a hierarchical random effects model,
taking into account this conditional (or gate) structure, as
well as the fact that CBAs in our data are nested in years. We
define Ykig as equal to one if restrictive item k is present in the
contract in year i in district g, and zero otherwise, with hkig
indicating similarly whether item k’s gate item is present. We
further let ϕkig equal the probability that Ykig equals one
conditional on hkig .
We estimate the structural model as follows:
 ϕkig 
log 
 = θig +
 1 − ϕkig 

K

∑γ D
k

kig

+ τi ,

(1)

j =1

where D is a dummy variable indicating whether each provision is present in each contract, with γ k therefore capturing
the conditional restrictiveness or severity of each item. θig is
a random effect for each contract, capturing that contract’s
latent restrictiveness. τt is a random effect for each year to
capture year-to-year variation in restrictiveness common to
all districts (contracts). After conditioning on the presence of
other provisions in the contract, the latent restrictiveness of
the contract is therefore estimated by the sum of θ ig and τ t,
the district and year random effects.
Because the raw contract restrictiveness units are not
immediately interpretable, we standardize the contract
restrictiveness measures within year. Thus, contract restrictiveness in each year has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one (see Table 1, Row 1). However, understanding
what a one standard deviation change in contract restrictiveness means in practical terms is still challenging. Using the
conditional severities generated from the PIIR model (γ k ) ,
we can further equate a standard deviation in contract restrictiveness to the probability that a given contract item is present in the CBA.4 For example, consider that the probability
that an average CBA specifies limitations on the length of
faculty meetings is 55%. The probability increases to 66%
for CBAs that are one standard deviation more restrictive. In
addition, the likelihood that an average contract provides a
full-time release to the union president for association business is 45%, but the probability jumps to 57% for contracts
that are one standard deviation above the mean. We provide
the predicted marginal probabilities for all items in the contract restrictiveness measure at one standard deviation above
and below the mean of contract restrictiveness in Online
Appendix Table A1.

District Inputs
Our primary measures of district inputs are expenditures,
including overall expenditures and expenditures on specific

categories of activity. Expenditure data come from the
California Department of Education (CDE), which requires
districts to report revenues and expenditures annually using a
standardized account code structure (SACS). The SACS
involves several levels of codes by which expenditures are
associated with specific goals (e.g., vocational education),
activities (e.g., curriculum development), and objects purchased (e.g., certificated teacher salaries).
We construct two measures of aggregate expenditures.
Following Ryan et al. (2017), our first measure is of student
expenditures, which corresponds to what the CDE calculates
as the “current expense of education” and is intended to capture expenditures that are both substantially discretionary
and relevant to the day-to-day educational experiences of
K-12 students. As a second measure of aggregate expenditure, we calculate instructional expenditures, consisting of
only those student expenditures explicitly associated with
instruction.5
These measures of aggregate expenditures can be thought
of as representing the level of district financial inputs into the
educational process. However, CBAs may also affect the
manner in which any given level of resources is allocated to
various activities. We therefore further isolate spending on
the specific subcategories of student expenditures considered
previously by Strunk (2011). These subcategories of expenditures include spending on all salaries, teacher salaries,
administrator salaries, all staff benefits, classified staff benefits, certificated staff benefits, instruction-related services,
books and supplies, pupil services, and special activities
overseen by the board of education and superintendent. All
expenditure categories and the SACS codes by which they
are identified are summarized in Online Appendix C.
We adjust expenditures for inflation using the consumer
price index for all consumers so that they are measured
in real (2014) dollars and for cost-of-living using the
Comparable Wage Index (CWI), which facilitates comparisons across geographic areas by accounting for regional
variation in the average cost of labor (Taylor & Fowler,
2006). We construct all measures as expenditures-per-pupil
and then use a natural log transformation to adjust the positive skew of the distribution. The second panel of Table 1
presents summary statistics for these variables in 2014 dollars before the log transformation. The table shows that the
average California district in our sample expended approximately 12,182 dollars per pupil in 2006–2007. This number
declined between 2009–2010 and 2012–2013, likely due to
recessionary pressures, but increased again in 2015–2016 to
12,779 dollars per pupil.
Changes to district inputs may manifest not only as
changes in the levels or distribution of expenditures but also
as changes in staffing if, for example, districts hire different
numbers or types of staff. We therefore use district staffing
data from the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES) and the CDE to measure districts’ student-to-teacher,
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M

2006–2007
SD

2,160
979
291
199
352
103
1,093
614
191
419
248
209
2.6
92.3
192.2
2.5
0.82
0.79
0.78
0.80
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

9,277
5,465
980
544
1,001
129
5,827
3,614
564
1,670
1,089
580
21.7
289.6
347.3
9.8
0.09
0.06
0.15
0.13
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.01
490

1.00
24.76
25.67
2.38
18.35
13.42
6.75
26.91
32,419
0.50

SD

0.00
50.66
53.72
10.01
26.31
32.11
15.67
27.98
11,414
0.57

M

2009–2010

0.00
0.01
0.00
0.01

0.11
0.09
0.19
0.18

23.7
300.4
317.4
10.6

8,658
5,055
918
524
971
119
5,320
3,268
520
1,631
1,057
574

0.00
52.90
55.77
10.07
21.18
32.97
15.35
27.34
11,643
0.51

M

490

SD

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.84
0.79
0.82
0.81

2.9
92.6
206.8
2.9

1,817
959
280
199
328
96
1,028
601
168
427
260
200

1.00
25.50
24.69
2.55
15.06
13.31
6.51
26.04
31,705
0.50

2012–2013

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.13
0.14
0.16
0.21

21.7
275.4
288.4
10.3

10,613
6,176
1,151
729
1,177
138
6,221
3,720
625
2,168
1,497
671

0.00
54.43
56.63
10.56
21.45
32.66
15.57
27.05
11,673
0.53

M

495

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.96
0.94
0.91
0.89

2.5
108.9
159.6
3.2

2,161
1,151
329
264
359
111
1,153
687
178
563
374
236

1.00
25.55
26.39
2.34
15.09
12.63
6.35
25.22
30,871
0.50

SD

2015–2016

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01

0.11
0.09
0.16
0.16

21.9
280.3
321.2
9.9

9,578
5,621
1,028
627
1,038
132
5,862
3,599
572
1,794
1,192
602

0.00
50.73
53.09
10.14
22.48
32.29
15.67
27.65
11,551
0.55

M

1,937

SD

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.86
0.84
0.83
0.84

2.8
94.0
193.4
2.9

2,126
1,093
313
243
351
117
1,127
653
180
513
338
222

1.00
25.42
26.23
2.47
16.38
13.19
6.68
26.34
32,440
0.50

All years

Note. Expenditures expressed in 2014 dollars; % Minority includes students who are neither White nor Asian. Contract restrictiveness, % SPED, and urbanicity are lagged by 1 year. ELA = English/
language arts; FRL = free and reduced price lunch students; SPED = special education students; ELL = English language learner students.

Contract restrictiveness
0.00
1.00
% FRL
44.53
24.81
% Minority students
45.78
26.88
% SPED
9.92
2.58
% ELL
20.91
16.22
% K-3
31.36
13.39
% Grades 7–8
16.11
7.12
% Grades 9–12
28.25
27.27
Enrollment
11,468
34,883
Declining enrollment
0.59
0.49
Per-pupil expenditures
Student
9,767
1,829
Instruction
5,795
940
Instruction-related services
1,065
299
Books and supplies
716
228
Pupil services
998
327
Board and superintendent
141
153
All salaries
6,090
1,010
Teacher salaries
3,804
575
Administrator salaries
581
167
All benefits
1,698
428
Certificated benefits
1,116
237
Classified benefits
583
229
Staffing inputs
Student:teacher ratio
20.7
2.3
Student:administrator ratio
254.4
71.6
Student:service staff ratio
332.3
207.8
Median years teaching experience
8.6
2.4
Average achievement
Math score
0.10
0.83
Math proficiency
0.08
0.83
ELA score
0.14
0.82
ELA proficiency
0.13
0.86
Efficiency ratios (achievement outcome over student expenditure)
Math score:student expenditure
0.00
0.00
Math proficiency:student expenditure
0.00
0.00
ELA score:student expenditure
0.00
0.00
ELA proficiency:student expenditure
0.01
0.00
Districts
462

Variables

Table 1. Summary Statistics.
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student-to-administrator, and student-to-support staff ratios
as well as the median years of teachers’ in-district experience. The third panel of Table 1 shows that the average district in 2006–2007 maintained a student–teacher ratio of 20.7
students per teacher. This number increases to as high as 23.7
in 2012–2013 but decreases to 21.7 in 2015–2016. We
observe similar patterns for the other staffing ratios.

District Achievement Outcomes
School districts are expected to achieve numerous and often
difficult-to-measure outcomes. An exhaustive inventory of
these outcomes, and thus a comprehensive evaluation of district effectiveness, is therefore not feasible. Acknowledging
this, we consider as measures of district effectiveness four
student achievement outcomes that are often of practical and
political interest and for which longitudinal data are readily
available: student scores (standardized across all districts in
the state in each year) and proficiency rates in math and
English/language arts (ELA) on standardized exams. As
shown in the fourth panel of Table 1, districts in our panel
have achievement slightly above the state average, by
roughly 10% of a district-level standard deviation in math
and 16% of a standard deviation in ELA. Although average
proficiency rates vary substantially over time, within any
given year a one-unit increase in these standardized measures (e.g., the difference between a district with a standardized achievement measure of zero and a district with a
standardized measure of one) represents a change in the
share of students who are rated proficient of roughly 16 to 18
percentage points in both subjects.

District Efficiency Measures
To create measures of district efficiency, we follow Ryan
et al. (2017), creating a series of efficiency ratios incorporating both school district inputs (expenditures) and outputs
(achievement). Specifically, we create 12 efficiency ratios by
dividing each district’s achievement outcomes in each year
(math and ELA scores and proficiency rates) by its total
per-pupil student expenditures, total per-pupil instructional
expenditures, and total per-pupil salary expenditures. The
resulting ratios do not have a concrete interpretation but have
the attractive feature of implying that districts are more efficient when their achievement levels are higher for a given
level of expenditure or when their expenditures are lower at
a given level of achievement. To facilitate interpretation, and
because in some cases their distributions are somewhat
skewed, we transform each ratio by its natural log. The summary statistics for the unlogged version of the measures
using student expenditures are shown in the bottom panel of
Table 1. Given the relatively small magnitude of average
achievement (around .10 of a standard deviation in 2006–
2007 for math), and the relatively large size of average
per-pupil district student expenditures (9,767 dollars per
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pupil in 2006–2007), the mean on the efficiency measures is
extremely small (approximately zero) in each year. Summary
statistics for the other efficiency measures are substantively
similar.

Other District Characteristics
We control for several time-varying characteristics of school
districts (see the top panel of Table 1) accounted for in prior
work and shown to be related to district expenditures and
student achievement, including the percentage of free and
reduced price lunch students, the percentage of minority students, the percentage of special education students, the percentage of English language learner students, the percentage
of K-3 students, the percentage of Grade 7 through Grade 8
students, the percentage of Grade 9 through Grade 12 students, the natural log of student enrollment, and an indicator
variable for whether the district is experiencing declining
enrollment (Marianno & Strunk, 2018b). We derive measures of these district characteristics from the School and
local education agency (LEA) Universe Surveys produced
by the NCES and from public files released by the CDE.

Empirical Strategy
As discussed above, previous work has relied on cross-sectional data to study the relationships between contract restrictiveness and school district achievement and expenditures.
This has limited the extent to which estimates of those relationships can be interpreted causally because it is likely that
they will be biased by unobserved heterogeneity across districts. Our longitudinal data allow us to mitigate some
(though not all) of these concerns by employing a fixed
effect specification. Specifically, we estimate a series of
models of the form:
Ydt = β1Restrictiveness dt −1 + X dt β2 + δd + γ t + ε dt ,

(2)

where Y is an outcome in district d in year t. Restrictiveness is
our predictor of interest, a measure of contract restrictiveness
calculated as described above. We use contract restrictiveness
in the prior year because it seems likely that the CBA in effect
in the previous year will have at least as much of an influence
as the contemporaneous contract on district operations in a
given year (because many district budgeting decisions will be
made prior to the start of a given school year, for example).6
Recall that the average time span for a contract in our sample
is 2.6 years, with all CBAs being in effect in year t − 1, but
with approximately 25% having been negotiated as early at
t − 4. For these observations, β1 may capture a longer term
effect than those observations with a first-year contract in t −
1. X is a vector of time-varying district characteristics likely
to affect district resource allocation and achievement.7 δd is a
set of district fixed effects to control for unobserved timeinvariant heterogeneity between districts. γ t is a set of
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year-specific dummy variables to control for changes over time
that are common to all districts in our sample. ε is an error
term. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Key to the fixed effect identification strategy is the
amount of within-district variation in contract restrictiveness
over time. Figures D1 and D2 of Online Appendix D explore
how contract restrictiveness changes over time using the
unstandardized measure. Figure D1 of Online Appendix D
plots average contract restrictiveness across the four bargaining cycles (2005–2006, 2008–2009, 2011–2012, 2014–2015)
and makes clear that unions are growing stronger over time in
California. Average contract restrictiveness was −0.29 (SD =
0.43) in 2005–2006 and was 0.18 (SD = 0.44) in 2014–2015,
a change of 0.47, or just over a standard deviation. Figure D2
of Online Appendix D plots the change in contract restrictiveness between negotiation cycles. The figure makes clear that
change in contract restrictiveness between contract years is
approximately normally distributed with an average change
of 0.15 or approximately one third of a standard deviation.
The figure further shows that while contract restrictiveness
in most districts changes incrementally, several districts are
on the tails of the distribution and experience substantial
changes in contract restrictiveness between contract cycles.
We further observe that for the median district in our sample,
their most and least restrictive CBA over the life of the panel
differs by 0.74 SD. For 90% of districts, their most and least
restrictive CBAs differ by at least 0.11 SD. This suggests that
we have adequate within-district variation for our fixed
effect analyses.
The identifying assumption of the fixed effect model is
that there are no time-varying factors correlated with contract restrictiveness that also affect district expenditures,
student achievement, and district efficiency. While this
assumption cannot be proven definitely, as we do not observe
all potential variables, Online Appendix E shows a series of
models predicting changes in contract restrictiveness as a
function of time-varying district-level characteristics. Online
Appendix Table E1 showcases that there are few, if any,
time-varying district characteristics that consistently predict
changes in contract restrictiveness over time. In Online
Appendix Table E2, we exploit the plausibly exogenous
expiration of CBAs to explore whether a high-profile court
case on union-protected state statutes, Vergara v. State of
California (2014), and changes to the state school funding
formula (Local Control Funding Formula [LCFF]) explain
changes to contract restrictiveness over time.8 In short, we
estimate a series of difference-in-difference models that
compare the restrictiveness of CBAs that expired before
Vergara and the implementation of the new state funding formula, to CBAs that expired after the court case and new law
had been enacted. We find that neither the court case nor the
change in the funding formula drove changes to contract
restrictiveness. Prior research on California CBAs also suggests that overall restrictiveness did not change as a result of
recessionary pressures (Strunk & Marianno, 2019). We test
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this identifying assumption further by running a series of
models that control for future contract restrictiveness (Online
Appendix G). If controlling for future contract restrictiveness changes our main estimates, then we may be concerned
that there may be unaccounted for factors related to changes
in contract restrictiveness, expenditures, and achievement.
Online Appendix Table G1 shows that controlling for future
contract restrictiveness does not change our main estimates.9
In Online Appendix H, we add additional lags of contract
restrictiveness to explore whether the effects of contract
restrictiveness take years to play out. Online Appendix Table
H1 also shows that controlling for multiple lags does not
meaningfully change our main estimates.10 These tests add
confidence but are not wholly conclusive that our identifying
assumption is met.

Results
District Inputs
Table 2 presents estimates of the relationship between contract restrictiveness and aggregate expenditure measures
(Columns 1 and 2) and several other categories of expenditure (Columns 3–6). Contract restrictiveness is positively
and significantly related to student (at the 10% level) and
instructional expenditures (at the 5% level); a one standard
deviation increase in contract restrictiveness is associated
with an increase in per-pupil student expenditures of approximately 1.2% (p = .053) or US$111 for the median district
in our sample.11
It is also useful to consider how district resource allocations vary with contract restrictiveness by considering subcategories of student spending. Overall spending increases
are not evenly distributed across the budget. Instructional
expenditures (those related to direct teacher–student interaction) are positively related to contract restrictiveness and so
too is spending on instruction-related services (i.e., services
supporting teacher–student interaction). A standard deviation
increase in contract restrictiveness is associated with an
increase in per-pupil spending on instruction of 1.3%—
approximately US$73—and on instruction-related services
of 1.9% or roughly US$20. This distinct category of expenditures includes such activities as curriculum development,
professional development, and general school administration. These increases do not appear to be driven by spending
on books and supplies (a category that includes many, though
not exclusively, expenditures dedicated to instruction and
instruction-related services). Expenditures on pupil services
and the operations of the school board and superintendent,
activities considered distinct from the instructional categories above, have similar point estimates but are estimated
less precisely, and are not statistically significant.
Table 3 presents results for expenditures on staff compensation. Given the increases in instructional and instructionrelated service expenditures, it is again unsurprising to see
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Table 2. Fixed Effect Regressions of Per-Pupil Expenditures on Contract Restrictiveness.

Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Student

Instruction

Instruction-related
services

Books and
supplies

Pupil services

Board and
superintendent

Contract restrictiveness
0.012† (0.006) 0.013* (0.006)
% FRL
−0.000 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001)
% Minority students
0.002* (0.001) 0.001* (0.001)
% SPED
0.003 (0.004)
0.005 (0.004)
% ELL
−0.002* (0.001) −0.002* (0.001)
% K-3
−0.006 (0.005) −0.005 (0.005)
% Grades 7–8
0.001 (0.006)
0.004 (0.006)
% Grades 9–12
0.001 (0.004)
0.001 (0.004)
ln(enrollment)
−0.331** (0.106) −0.322* (0.134)
Declining enrollment
0.021* (0.009) 0.023** (0.009)
District and year fixed
Yes
Yes
effects
n
1,927
1,927
Districts
566
566
.93
.93
R2

0.019** (0.007)
0.000 (0.001)
0.003** (0.001)
−0.002 (0.005)
−0.001 (0.001)
−0.004 (0.006)
0.003 (0.008)
0.000 (0.005)
−0.238* (0.095)
0.031** (0.011)
Yes
1,927
566
.92

0.004 (0.013)
0.012 (0.008)
0.016 (0.015)
0.001 (0.001)
−0.000 (0.001)
−0.001 (0.001)
0.004** (0.002) 0.002** (0.001)
0.001 (0.002)
0.002 (0.007)
0.001 (0.005)
−0.009 (0.008)
−0.003* (0.001)
−0.001 (0.001)
−0.003 (0.002)
−0.001 (0.010) −0.013* (0.006)
−0.008 (0.007)
−0.005 (0.012)
−0.002 (0.008) −0.019* (0.009)
0.004 (0.008)
0.000 (0.004)
−0.008 (0.006)
−0.315* (0.147) −0.406** (0.147) −0.723*** (0.142)
−0.006 (0.015)
0.023* (0.010)
0.026 (0.017)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,927
566
.89

1,927
566
.95

1,927
566
.94

Note. Standard errors clustered on districts in parentheses. Contract restrictiveness is from the prior year and standardized to have a standard deviation
of one in each year. Financial outcomes are per-pupil and natural log transformed.
†
p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
FRL = free and reduced price lunch students; SPED = special education students; ELL = English language learner students.

Table 3. Fixed Effect Regressions of Salary and Benefit Expenditures on Contract Restrictiveness.
Salaries

Variables

Benefits

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

All

Teachers

Administrators

All

Certificated staff

Classified staff

Contract
0.014* (0.006)
restrictiveness
% FRL
−0.001 (0.001)
% Minority students
0.001* (0.001)
% SPED
0.003 (0.004)
% ELL
−0.001† (0.001)
% K-3
−0.005 (0.005)
% Grades 7–8
0.002 (0.005)
% Grades 9–12
0.001 (0.003)
ln(enrollment)
−0.363** (0.120)
Declining enrollment 0.025** (0.008)
District and year
Yes
fixed effects
n
1,927
Districts
566
.94
R2

0.013* (0.006)
−0.001 (0.001)
0.001† (0.001)
0.002 (0.004)
−0.002* (0.001)
−0.005 (0.005)
0.004 (0.006)
0.001 (0.004)
−0.346* (0.139)
0.026** (0.008)
Yes

0.016* (0.007)

0.011 (0.007)

0.008 (0.008)

0.016* (0.008)

−0.001 (0.001)
−0.001 (0.001)
0.003** (0.001)
0.002* (0.001)
−0.001 (0.004)
0.002 (0.005)
−0.001 (0.001)
−0.001 (0.001)
−0.003 (0.005)
−0.008 (0.005)
−0.002 (0.006)
0.005 (0.006)
0.001 (0.004)
0.000 (0.004)
−0.411*** (0.097) −0.321** (0.117)
0.021* (0.010)
0.024* (0.010)
Yes
Yes

−0.001 (0.001)
0.002* (0.001)
0.002 (0.005)
−0.001 (0.001)
−0.008 (0.006)
0.006 (0.006)
−0.000 (0.004)
−0.262* (0.130)
0.025* (0.011)
Yes

−0.000 (0.001)
0.002† (0.001)
0.003 (0.005)
−0.001 (0.001)
−0.009† (0.005)
0.002 (0.007)
0.000 (0.004)
−0.438*** (0.097)
0.021* (0.010)
Yes

1,927
566
.92

1,927
566
.93

1,927
566
.95

1,927
566
.94

1,927
566
.94

Note. Standard errors clustered on districts in parentheses. Contract restrictiveness is from the prior year and standardized to have a standard deviation
of one in each year. Financial outcomes are per-pupil and natural log transformed.
†
p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
FRL = free and reduced price lunch students; SPED = special education students; ELL = English language learner students.

increased salaries, which make up a large portion of instructional expenditures, associated with contract restrictiveness.
A one standard deviation increase in contract restrictiveness

is associated with increased salary expenditures of 1.4%,
consistent across both teachers and administrators. Because
salary expenditures make up a substantial share of district
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Table 4. Fixed Effect Regressions of Staffing Inputs on Contract Restrictiveness.

Variables
Contract restrictiveness
% FRL
% Minority students
% SPED
% ELL
% K-3
% Grades 7–8
% Grades 9–12
ln(enrollment)
Declining enrollment
District and year fixed
effects
n
Districts
R2

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Student:teacher
ratio

Student:administrator
ratio

Student:support
staff ratio

Median teacher district
experience

−0.132 (0.083)
−0.005 (0.009)
−0.012 (0.008)
0.003 (0.045)
0.008 (0.012)
0.013 (0.054)
−0.034 (0.071)
0.072† (0.038)
1.929* (0.821)
−0.238* (0.100)
Yes

−4.549 (3.672)
−0.174 (0.374)
−0.314 (0.267)
−1.202 (1.982)
−0.411 (0.593)
−4.836† (2.701)
−3.522 (2.955)
−2.741 (2.596)
24.333 (37.097)
−5.669 (4.266)
Yes

4.739 (11.089)
0.561 (1.546)
0.243 (0.870)
−9.258† (5.491)
−0.949 (2.032)
−0.348 (5.516)
7.679 (9.406)
−4.353 (4.894)
23.018 (68.583)
−12.662 (11.675)
Yes

0.040 (0.109)
0.003 (0.009)
0.012 (0.009)
0.011 (0.087)
−0.037** (0.013)
−0.045 (0.070)
0.047 (0.084)
0.134** (0.051)
−6.160*** (1.201)
0.253* (0.125)
Yes

1,920
565
.85

1,918
564
.65

1,899
557
.64

1,906
561
.79

Note. Standard errors clustered on districts in parentheses. Contract restrictiveness is from the prior year and standardized to have a standard deviation
of one in each year.
†
p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
FRL = free and reduced price lunch students; SPED = special education students; ELL = English language learner students.

budgets, these increases may be of practical importance. For
example, a 1.3% increase in teacher salary expenditure for
the median district in our sample represents approximately
US$48 per pupil or more than US$1,000 for a classroom of
22 students. Similarly, a 1.6% increase in administrator salary expenditure for the median district is equivalent to US$9
per pupil or US$5,589 for a school of average size (621 students). Spending on nonwage compensation increases to a
lesser degree and is only significant for classified staff.12
Spending on staff compensation can increase for a number of reasons, including raises negotiated into the salary
schedule, increases in the education or experience levels of
teachers, or changes in the number of staff per student. We
consider several of these possibilities in Table 4. Increases
in contract restrictiveness are associated with decreases in
student-to-teacher and student-to-administrator ratios, suggestive of increases in the number of these staff per student.
These estimates are not statistically significant but are sufficient in magnitude to explain a portion of observed
increases in salary expenditures, particularly for administrators. The increase in the student-to-support staff ratio
suggests that districts with stronger unions may shift staff
away from pupil service roles (such as guidance counselors) and toward teaching and administrative staff, but this
coefficient is imprecisely estimated. We find no evidence of
changes in the average level of teacher experience; increases
in teacher salary expenditures may therefore derive from
increases in both the number of teachers and their overall
salary levels.

District Outputs
As shown in Table 5, after controlling for district characteristics, including district fixed effects, contract restrictiveness
is not significantly related to student achievement outcomes.
This is true for both math and ELA outcomes, and regardless
of whether outcomes are measured in terms of average scores
or student proficiency rates. This suggests that stronger
unions are not necessarily detrimental to student achievement. However, estimates are consistently negative across all
four achievement measures; if contract restrictiveness is not
clearly linked to diminished student outcomes, we find even
less evidence that student learning is enhanced.

District Efficiency
Evidence presented above shows that stronger unions are
associated with higher levels of district spending but not with
changes in achievement. If districts are spending more and
student learning is not improving, this suggests that districts
with stronger unions also tend to be less efficient. To test this
formally, we estimate models with the efficiency ratios as
outcomes (Table 6). Because these ratios are transformed by
the natural logarithm, the coefficients can be interpreted
roughly as percent changes in efficiency predicted by a standard deviation increase in contract restrictiveness.
As expected, estimates are uniformly negative and statistically significant. Depending on the achievement and expenditure measure used, a standard deviation increase in contract
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Table 5. Fixed Effect Regressions of Student Achievement on Contract Restrictiveness.
Math

Variables
Contract restrictiveness
% FRL
% Minority students
% SPED
% ELL
% K-3
% Grades 7–8
% Grades 9–12
ln(enrollment)
Declining enrollment
District and year fixed
effects
n
Districts
R2

ELA

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Score

Proficiency

Score

Proficiency

−0.018 (0.022)
−0.001 (0.002)
−0.004† (0.002)
−0.013 (0.010)
−0.003 (0.003)
0.026** (0.010)
0.031* (0.013)
0.009 (0.007)
0.155 (0.144)
0.008 (0.025)
Yes

−0.022 (0.020)
−0.002 (0.001)
−0.005** (0.002)
−0.016† (0.009)
−0.002 (0.002)
0.020* (0.009)
0.028* (0.012)
0.006 (0.006)
0.195 (0.131)
0.018 (0.023)
Yes

−0.004 (0.014)
−0.001 (0.001)
−0.001 (0.001)
−0.005 (0.007)
−0.006*** (0.002)
0.001 (0.006)
0.015† (0.008)
0.005 (0.005)
0.218† (0.115)
0.029* (0.014)
Yes

−0.010 (0.016)
−0.000 (0.001)
−0.001 (0.001)
−0.001 (0.007)
−0.009*** (0.002)
−0.002 (0.007)
0.014 (0.009)
0.005 (0.005)
0.123 (0.112)
0.024 (0.016)
Yes

1,924
565
.90

1,924
565
.91

1,924
565
.97

1,924
565
.96

Note. Standard errors clustered on districts in parentheses. Contract restrictiveness is from the prior year and is standardized to have a standard
deviation of one in each year. Achievement measures are standardized within year across all districts in California.
†
p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
FRL = free and reduced price lunch students; SPED = special education students; ELL = English language learner students.

restrictiveness is associated with a decrease in efficiency of
1.3% to 2.4% (or 0.03–0.05 SD). Using the benchmarks suggested by Kraft (2020), efficiency effects in the magnitude of
0.03 to 0.05 SD can be considered small in size when compared with those obtained from other educational interventions. Back-of-the-envelope estimates based on these results
imply that across all years of our data, a district with average
student proficiency rates (46% in math and 52% in ELA) and
average student spending per pupil (US$9,578) would be
expected to spend roughly an additional US$200 (2%) per
pupil with no change in student achievement for a standard
deviation increase in contract restrictiveness.

Limitations
This study is not without a few limitations. First, we only
measure efficiency using standardized achievement scores as
our indicator of productive output. It could be that contract
restrictiveness is associated with other productive benefits
not fully captured by test-based measures of student learning. For example, a strong teacher CBA could build a more
collaborative and caring school environment, which could
result in improvements in teacher retention, student socialemotional learning, absences, suspensions, and on-time
grade progression. While these factors are likely correlated
with performance on standardized exams, employing alternative measures of efficiency could yield a different result
than the one observed in this article. In addition, standardized tests only measure short-run student outcomes, making

it impossible to say anything about the long-run effects of
unions on school district efficiency. Unfortunately, given
data constraints inherent to the California public datasets, we
are unable to examine alternative measures of productivity.
Second, our results should not be interpreted as evidence
that contract restrictiveness causes higher expenditures or
overall district inefficiency. While we believe our estimates
lean more toward causal evidence than those obtained in
much of the prior work, they may still be susceptible to
omitted variable bias, particularly from unobserved timevarying confounders. This is certainly an avenue for future
research, particularly as states reform their collective bargaining regulations in ways that might allow for stronger
causal identification.
Finally, our results do not generalize to all labor contexts.
We generate estimates on the influence of teachers’ unions
on school district efficiency by comparing districts along the
margins of changes in contract restrictiveness. While doing
so improves the internal validity of the estimates, it does
limit, to some extent, the external validity of our study. These
results are confined to California, where nearly all teachers
in traditional public school districts are covered by a CBA
and are represented by some of the strongest teachers’ unions
in the nation (Winkler et al., 2013). Our results may not generalize to other states where not all teachers are represented
by a union, where the scope of collective bargaining is different, or where schools are funded differently. Instead, our
results provide an understanding of the efficiency implications of teachers’ unions in a context where unions are
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Variables

% proficiency

Score

1,924
565
.92

1,924
565
.93

−0.017† (0.010) −0.023† (0.013)
−0.000 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001)
−0.002* (0.001) −0.004** (0.001)
−0.007 (0.006) −0.014* (0.007)
0.001 (0.001)
0.001 (0.001)
0.015** (0.006) 0.018* (0.007)
0.011 (0.008)
0.020* (0.009)
0.003 (0.005)
0.004 (0.005)
0.385** (0.130) 0.435** (0.133)
−0.014 (0.012)
0.012 (0.015)
Yes
Yes

% proficiency

Score

1,924
565
.96

1,924
565
.96

−0.013† (0.007) −0.018* (0.008)
−0.000 (0.001)
0.000 (0.001)
−0.002* (0.001) −0.004*** (0.001)
−0.004 (0.004)
−0.005 (0.005)
−0.000 (0.001)
−0.002† (0.001)
0.006 (0.005)
0.007 (0.005)
0.005 (0.007)
0.007 (0.007)
0.001 (0.004)
0.003 (0.004)
0.387*** (0.097) 0.357*** (0.103)
−0.010 (0.009)
−0.003 (0.010)
Yes
Yes

(4)

(3)

ln(ELA outcome/student
expenditure)

1,924
565
.91

−0.018† (0.010)
0.000 (0.001)
−0.002* (0.001)
−0.009 (0.006)
0.000 (0.001)
0.014* (0.006)
0.008 (0.008)
0.002 (0.005)
0.376* (0.159)
−0.016 (0.012)
Yes

Score

(5)

1,924
565
.92

−0.023† (0.013)
−0.000 (0.001)
−0.004** (0.001)
−0.017* (0.007)
0.001 (0.001)
0.017* (0.007)
0.018† (0.009)
0.004 (0.005)
0.426** (0.159)
0.011 (0.014)
Yes

% proficiency

(6)

ln(math outcome/instructional
expenditure)

1,924
565
.95

−0.013† (0.007)
0.000 (0.001)
−0.002* (0.001)
−0.007 (0.005)
−0.001 (0.001)
0.005 (0.005)
0.003 (0.007)
0.001 (0.004)
0.379** (0.126)
−0.012 (0.009)
Yes

Score

(7)

1,924
565
.95

−0.019* (0.008)
0.001 (0.001)
−0.003*** (0.001)
−0.008† (0.005)
−0.002* (0.001)
0.006 (0.005)
0.004 (0.006)
0.003 (0.004)
0.349** (0.131)
−0.005 (0.009)
Yes

% proficiency

(8)

ln(ELA outcome/instructional
expenditure)

1,924
565
.90

−0.018† (0.009)
0.000 (0.001)
−0.002† (0.001)
−0.006 (0.006)
0.001 (0.001)
0.015* (0.006)
0.008 (0.008)
0.002 (0.005)
0.401* (0.162)
−0.018 (0.012)
Yes

Score

(9)

1,924
565
.92

−0.024† (0.012)
−0.000 (0.001)
−0.004** (0.001)
−0.013† (0.007)
0.001 (0.001)
0.017* (0.007)
0.017† (0.009)
0.004 (0.005)
0.450** (0.160)
0.008 (0.014)
Yes

% proficiency

(10)

ln(math outcome/teacher salary
expenditure)

1,924
565
.95

−0.014* (0.007)
0.000 (0.001)
−0.002* (0.001)
−0.004 (0.005)
−0.000 (0.001)
0.005 (0.006)
0.002 (0.007)
0.001 (0.004)
0.403** (0.130)
−0.015† (0.009)
Yes

Score

(11)

1,924
565
.95

−0.019* (0.008)
0.001 (0.001)
−0.003** (0.001)
−0.005 (0.005)
−0.002* (0.001)
0.006 (0.005)
0.004 (0.007)
0.002 (0.004)
0.373** (0.135)
−0.008 (0.009)
Yes

% proficiency

(12)

ln(ELA outcome/teacher salary
expenditure)

Note. Standard errors clustered on districts in parentheses. Outcomes are the ratio of the listed achievement outcome to per-pupil student expenditures, which is then natural log transformed. Contract restrictiveness is from the
prior year and standardized to have a standard deviation of one in each year.
†
p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
FRL = free and reduced price lunch students; SPED = special education students; ELL = English language learner students.

Contract restrictiveness
% FRL
% Minority students
% SPED
% ELL
% K-3
% Grades 7–8
% Grades 9–12
ln(enrollment)
Declining enrollment
District and year fixed
effects
n
Districts
R2

(2)

(1)

ln(math outcome/student
expenditure)

Table 6. Fixed Effect Regressions of Efficiency Ratios on Contract Restrictiveness.
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afforded a fairly robust scope for collective bargaining negotiations in a labor-friendly state.

Discussion and Conclusion
More than three decades of research on teachers’ unions have
failed to empirically resolve theoretical claims about the
effects of unions on school districts. We build on prior work
by using a unique panel dataset of a novel measure of contract restrictiveness in a series of fixed effect models that
control for time-invariant sources of omitted variable bias
left unaccounted for in prior studies. Furthermore, we employ
new measures of district efficiency that allow us to more
directly explore the relationship between contract restrictiveness and the relative changes in district productive inputs and
outputs over time.
We find some evidence that teachers’ unions are rentseeking organizations and highlight the importance of simultaneously considering their influences on expenditures and
productivity levels. When estimating just the relationship
between contract restrictiveness and productivity, one might
conclude that unions have no adverse effects on operations.
However, when considered alongside our estimates of
increased district expenditure levels, the same results provide suggestive evidence that expenditures are made less
efficient by rigid work rules advocated for by unions.
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the effect
sizes we observe are small in magnitude. We would likely
observe different effects in locations where unions face more
or less favorable legal and political climates. For example,
compared with their counterparts in many other states, school
districts in California are relatively dependent on state aid.
This may limit the ability of local teachers’ unions to bargain
for higher spending levels, attenuating our expenditure
results relative to what might be observed elsewhere.
Similarly, our analyses focus on school districts and
unions that change the restrictiveness of their CBAs over
time. We cannot speak directly to other mechanisms by
which unions might influence district operations or to the
aggregate impacts of unionization. For example, stronger
unions might influence district operations not only by bargaining more restrictive CBAs but also by influencing school
board elections (Strunk & Grissom, 2010) or inducing competition from charter schools (Stoddard & Corcoran, 2007).
The effects of increasing CBA restrictiveness might also be
dwarfed by the effects of forming (or disbanding) a teachers’
union in the first place. On one hand, given that CBA restrictiveness is correlated with teachers’ union strength (Strunk &
Grissom, 2010), our results may indicate that unions have
qualitatively similar effects on districts when advancing their
interests through those other mechanisms. On the other hand,
the moderating role of context and the diverse roles played
by teachers’ unions mean that our results should be generalized cautiously.
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Nevertheless, our findings have important implications
for policy. New legislative activity designed to curtail union
rights is frequently based on the premise that union actions
reduce school efficiency by hamstringing administrators. We
provide evidence that limiting contract restrictiveness (e.g.,
loosening collective bargaining rules) might indeed provide
school leaders with some additional flexibility to manage
their finances more efficiently. However, our estimated effect
sizes suggest that the benefits of such changes would be
minimal.
In short, we find little to suggest that wholesale reductions
of union power in education will drastically improve the efficiency of school districts. But nor do we find evidence that
status quo union power is benefiting students and schools.
Our results suggest that a local, collaborative approach to
modifying specific CBA policies that are the most detrimental to efficiency is warranted. Future research could help by
identifying the specific policies that are the most helpful or
harmful to district operations. Such an approach, built on
evidence of the effects of collective bargaining and other
union-supported policies, will maintain important teacher
working conditions while removing obstacles to efficiency.
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Notes
1. Paglayan (2019) does find that mandatory bargaining laws that
did not limit a union’s right to strike led to small increases in
educational spending.
2. One exception is a study of unionization in California charter
schools by Matsudaira and Patterson (2017). They find that
unionization increases student achievement in mathematics
but has no effect on English test scores.
3. California law requires that collective bargaining agreements
(CBAs) be renegotiated every 3 years, but districts and unions
may choose to renegotiate CBAs more frequently. In addition,
if contract negotiations are not completed within the 3-year window, the prior CBA remains effective until replaced. Thus, a
CBA we observe as operational in any given year may have been
renegotiated off-cycle or may be identical to the CBA observed
in the district in previous or subsequent observations. About 13%
of school districts in 2012 rolled over their 2009 CBA.
4. The conditional severities (γ k ) from the partial independent item response (PIIR) model capture the value of
contract restrictiveness at which a given item has 0.5 likelihood of appearing in a contract. The severities are easily converted into conditional probabilities at a given level
of contract restrictiveness using the following formula:
ϕk = exp(( x + s ) − γ k ) / (1 + exp(( x + s ) − γ k )) , where γ k represents the conditional severity of the item, and x and s are
constants that represent the sample mean and standard deviation of contract restrictiveness. We can further convert the
conditional probabilities into marginal probabilities by multiplying the conditional probability of a given item by the conditional probabilities of its gate items.
5. We also created a measure of total expenditures, which
includes all district expenditures except for spending on adult
or pre-kindergarten education. However, this measure contains
a few additional categories of spending like capital outlays and
facility acquisitions that are not as directly affected by contract
language, that tend to fluctuate quite substantially from year
to year, and that are often funded through alternative funding
streams (like facility bonds). Consequently, the total expenditure measures tend to contain more noise. Results from models
using total expenditures are shown in Online Appendix B. The
coefficients from these models tend to be larger in magnitude
and less precisely estimated than the coefficients derived from
models using student expenditures.
6. In regressions not shown but available upon request, using a
contemporaneous contract restrictiveness measure produces
estimates that are qualitatively similar, though in some cases
smaller in magnitude, to those derived using a lagged measure.
7. In addition to being potentially associated with different costs,
students in distinct grade levels are funded at disparate rates by
the state and will thus be associated mechanically with different resources.
8. There may be concern that the implementation of the Local
Control Funding Formula (LCFF, 2013, Cal. Educ. Code §
42238.02) in California significantly altered the way districts
spend money and the way they negotiate contracts. To assess
this possibility, we estimate a difference-in-difference model
exploring the relationship between contract negotiations and
expenditure outcomes pre/post LCFF implementation. Treated
districts are those that negotiated their contract after the

9.

10.

11.

12.

implementation of LCFF. Control districts are those that negotiated their contract before the implementation of LCFF (thus,
the restrictiveness of their CBA was unaffected by the reform).
We find much higher spending post LCFF (as expected) but no
significant differences in expenditures for districts that negotiated their CBA post LCFF (see Online Appendix Table F1).
Online Appendix Table G1, Panel A, shows our main results
as presented in the article. Online Appendix Table G1, Panel
B, shows our main results dropping the last year of the panel.
Online Appendix Table G1, Panel C, shows how our estimates
change when controlling for future restrictiveness. Comparing
Panel A with Panel B shows that the main change in the statistical significance of our results stems from dropping the last
year of the panel. Panel C shows that future CBA restrictiveness is never predictive of current outcomes (Panel C) and
coefficients on lagged CBA restrictiveness are essentially
unchanged by additionally controlling for future CBA restrictiveness. This further bolsters our interpretation that the causal
arrow runs from CBA restrictiveness to district outcomes
rather than the other way around.
Including additional lags shrinks our estimation sample
(because we do not have a lag for the 2005–2006 contracts).
Although this has few implications for the size of our estimates, we do lose statistical significance when dropping the
first year of the panel (Online Appendix Table H1, Panel B).
Panel C shows that CBAs from t-4 do not significantly predict
any of these outcomes and when included as a control in the
models, do not substantially change the size of our estimates
for t − 1. This suggests that while the effects of CBAs may
take some time to play out in districts, they can nevertheless
play out over the relatively short term. This again bolsters the
causal interpretation of our primary results, suggesting that
they are not driven by preexisting district trends.
After accounting for fixed district characteristics, our point
estimates for district inputs are much smaller than those found
in prior work in California. For example, Strunk (2011) finds
a significant positive relationship between contract restrictiveness and overall expenditures and student-related expenditures
by about 13%. The decrease in the size of the estimates with
the inclusion of the district fixed effects likely suggests that
the cross-sectional estimates shown in prior work suffer from
omitted variable bias.
This increase in classified staff benefits appears to be driven primarily by increases on behalf of classified staff to public employees’ retirement system (PERS), Social Security, Medicare, and
other alternative retirement plans. These costs account for 42%
of classified staff benefit costs and (in regressions not shown)
have significant increases similar in magnitude to classified
benefits as a whole. Most other classified benefit costs (e.g.,
for health and welfare benefits) also appear to increase, but
these coefficients are imprecisely estimated and not statistically
significant.
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